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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After the decision of the Supreme Court in the first appeal of this case, a 
motion was made to disqualify the judge without cause. Arguments were held 
and briefs were written. The district judge ruled it was not necessary for him to 
disqualify himself. 
About a year later the district judge rendered a new decision which 
allegedly covered the issues the Supreme Court said needed to be addressed. 
Prior to this decision the district court made no contact with counsel, nor were 
any requests for information or even notice of what the court was doing ever 
given. A motion for reconsideration of the decision was filed. The matter was 
argued and the motion was denied. From the above facts this Appeal was taken. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in not granting Defendant's motion 
to disqualify without cause. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in not properly addressing damages. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in not properly finding the value of 
the land. 
4. Whether the District Court erred in its determination of the amount 
of!and damaged. 
5. Whether attorney fees and costs should be awarded to Farr West 
when this is simply asked to second guess the District Court ruling. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A district court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally 
construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the district 
court's role as trier of fact. Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Green, 137 Idaho 832, 
835, 54, p.3 948,951 (2002) (citing Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,269, 985 
p.2d 1127 (1999); Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854,857,949 p.2d 1061, 1064 
(1997)). Review of the decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the 
conclusions oflaw. Id. If the findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, 
even if the evidence is conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Id. 
However, this Court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Id. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Attorney fees may be awarded on appeal under I.A.R.41 and LC. §12-
121. Attorney fees should be awarded to the Respondent because the appeal 
brought out all the legal mistakes in the law made by the district judge. Because 
of the above Respondent should be deemed the prevailing party on Appeal. 
Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,659 p.2d 160 (Ct. App. 1983). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
A. FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY WITHOUT CAUSE 
On January 3 2007, the Defendant timely filed a Motion to disqualify the 
district judge who originally tried this case. (C.R.P. p.3) On May 30, 2007, the 
district judge issued a MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY. (C.R.P. p.19-22) Basically the 
district court stated it did not need to disqualify itself because of its 
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interpretation of the case of Liebelt v. Liebelt, 125 Idaho 302 (ct. App. 1994) and 
judicial economy. (C.R.P. p.20) These two issues will next be examined to see if 
they are valid. 
The district court stated Plaintiffs objection to the motion to disqualify 
was well taken because the Liebelt case was "authority to deny the motion 
because the case was not remanded for a new trial, merely for additional finding 
of fact. This court agrees, and therefore denies the motion". (C.R.P. p.20) The 
district court went on the say "The Idaho court of Appeals reached the same 
conclusion in Liebelt. There, the Court held the rule did not apply when a case 
was remanded for additional findings of fact, 125 Idaho at 305. The Court of 
Appeals held that it is not a "new trial" for operation of the rule. This case was 
also remanded for additional finding of fact, not for a new trial. In that regard 
this case and Liebelt are very similar, and similar results should obtain. The 
court will not grant the motion to disqualify." (C.R.P. p.20) 
The Supreme Court stated this case was remanded for "further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion". Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641,647 
(2006). The Supreme Court also stated "the case must be remanded back to the 
district court for further findings of fact." Id. At 645 The district court did make 
further findings of fact as set forth in it's Memorandum Decision and Order. In 
fact, no new trial was ordered. In this case the matter was tried over 
approximately five (5) days with multiple on-site inspections by the court. The 
appellant did not like the result of the district court decision. With no "new 
trial" being ordered, Topaz may not go shopping for a different judge or hoped 
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for different result. The District Court correctly interpreted the Liebelt case. 
The judge therefore denied appropriately the motion to disqualify. 
B.DAMAGES 
In the Supreme Court's opinion it remanded the case because the district 
court "improperly measured actual damages for Lower's trespass." Ransom v. 
Topaz, 143 Idaho 641,647 (2006). The Supreme Court stated there were two 
separate matters the district court did wrong and thus must conduct "further 
proceedings consistent with the opinion" to complete the matter. Id. At 647. 
Those two matters are as follows: (1) The district court "failed to distinguish 
between damages attributable to Lower's permissible trespass to create or 
maintain an access road and damages attributable to excessive intrusion 
exceeding the scope of the easement" and, (2) to distinguish "between costs to 
repair temporary damage and an award of damages for permanent damage to 
the property". Id. At 647. The District Court did exactly what was directed on 
the remand. 
In regards to the first matter set forth above, the district court ruled 
there were a number of damages which did arise from the modifications of the 
easement including those trespassed outside of the easement. Those include 
erosion, sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land out side the easement, 
removal and deposit of soil on Plaintiffs land, failure to install culverts, and 
mitigate the altered and increased flow of water onto Plaintiffs land outside the 
easement. As a result of the above the district court gave two examples of the 
injury cause, i.e. "50% of precipitation does not percolate into the newly 
graveled area and thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto Plaintiffs land 
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and the sloughing caused by the increase of water has rendered the land useless 
for building and cultivating". (C.R.A. p.24, last paragraph). 
The main issue relating to these findings is the question of whether they 
are supported by any facts. Before going into these issues it is important for this 
Court to look at the Clerk's Record on Appeal. No new evidence was requested 
by the district court nor was any hearing held concerning what need be done 
because of the remand. The probable reasons for this are set out in the district 
court's Memorandum decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Disqualify. (C.R.A. p.19-21) In this decision the district court stated "The 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court does not order a new trial. It remands the 
case back to this Court for additional findings of fact on the measure of damages 
for trespass. This Court has previously heard the evidence in this case and made 
the findings which are to be supplemented. This Court is in the best position to 
make those additional findings". (C.R.P. p. 20) From these statements it is 
apparent the Court did not want, and thought it did not need, any more hearings 
or evidence. The Courts findings are supported in the record. Topaz wants this 
Court to second guess what the district heard, saw and observed. 
Topaz grossly misstated the District Courts findings in the Memorandum 
Decision and Order of December S, 2007. The District Court ruled: 
The first issue is addressed by looking at the injuries to the land 
including: erosion, cuts made by Defendant in the land outside of the granted 
easement, removal and deposit of sail to and from Plaintiffs land, grading, 
cutting trees, placing gravel, removal of fences, and exceeding the scope of the 
easement. Damages to the property which are not compensable are the injuries 
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which are natural effect of creating or improving the easement. These include: 
grading, cutting trees, placing gravel and removal of obstructing fences within 
the easement. The Supreme Court has said that the easement may be modified 
according to the granted easement. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing L.P., 143 Idaho 
641,645 (2006). Thus this Court will not award any damages directly caused by 
these actions. However where the modifications constitute an enlargement of the 
use or an unreasonable increase in the burden of the easement on the 
subservient estate then the resulting injuries may be compensable. Abbott v. 
Nampa School Dist. No 131, 119 Idaho 544 (Idaho 1991). The Supreme Court in 
remanding this case has instructed how to compensate for excessive and 
unnecessary injuries. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 644-645. 
The injuries which are compensable because they are excessive and 
unnecessary are the permanent and temporary damages which do not naturally 
arise from the modifications of the easement. These include the erosion and 
sloughing caused by cuts made on Plaintiffs land and Defendants failure to 
install culverts or otherwise mitigate the altered and increased flow of water 
onto Plaintiffs land outside the easement. An example of this kind of injury to 
Plaintiffs land is found in the fact that 50% of precipitation does not percolate 
into the newly graveled area and thus causes erosion and water intrusion onto 
Plaintiffs land. The sloughing caused by the increase of water has rendered the 
land useless for building or cultivating. This is an unreasonable increase in the 
burden on the subservient estate and the Court feels that some damages should 
be awarded. 
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The second issue deals with computation of the damages to be awarded 
and requires the Court to distinguish between temporary and permanent 
damages. This case is unique because there is an overlap of the permanent and 
temporary injuries to the land. An example of this is the sloughing which has 
occurred on the land. The sloughing has caused some of the fill dirt to be 
washed down stream and lost forever, however the sloughing may be remedied 
as indicated by the proposals of Biggs Enterprises. While the injuries to the land 
which are continuing in nature and not abatable are permanent injuries, the 
continued sloughing can be abated if the land is put back to its natural state. 
This makes the distinction of the damages difficult as it fits both categories to an 
extent. The Court feels that the loss of the soil due to the erosion is a permanent 
injury to the land as far as that soil is unrecoverable. This has also made the 
land impossible to farm as the loss of soil proves detrimental to the objective. 
The sloughing has made the land useless, furthermore the soil which has been 
lost and the pristine nature of the land has been lost forever. Thus the loss of 
soil is a permanent injury. 
The Supreme Court has instructed that the measure of these permanent 
damages be assessed by a computation of the fair market value of the land 
immediately prior to the injury and the fair market value of the land 
immediately following the injury. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 645. The Plaintiffs 
have not proved any diminution of the property value as a result of the 
permanent injuries to the land therefore this Court cannot award such damages. 
However, as mentioned above there are temporary injuries involved in 
this case as well. Examples of the temporary injuries involved in this care are 
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the cuts made on Plaintiffs land outside of the easement, without permission, the 
sloughing and pooling caused by the cuts, and the removal and deposit of soil 
onto Plaintiffs land. According to the estimate provided by Biggs, these can be 
restored to their natural state, drain pipes can be put in place to prevent pooling 
and measures can be erected which will prevent future sloughing and restore the 
land to its pre-injury state. Injuries which can be abated, are temporary in 
nature and can be compensated for by awarding the amount necessary to restore 
the land to its condition prior to the injury. The Supreme Court has stated, "[I]f 
the cause of the injury is abatable or preventable and the injury capable of 
rectification by reasonable restoration, i.e., not exceeding the damage to the 
property, the injury will be considered temporary and not permanent." Alexko v. 
Union Pacific Railroad co., 62 Idaho 235,240 (1941). Because the land here can 
be rectified the damages are only temporary. In actions of temporary injury to 
land, the owner is entitled to recover amount necessary to repair injury and put 
land in condition it was at time immediately preceding injury. Powell v. Sellers, 
130 Idaho 122, (Ct. App. 1997). In regard to temporary injury to property, if the 
cost of restoration exceeds the value of the premises in their original condition, 
or in the diminution of market value, the latter are limits of recovery; however, 
because the goal of compensatory damages is reimbursement of the actual loss 
suffered, the rule precluding recovery in excess of the diminution of value is not 
of invariable application. Ransom, 143 Idaho 641 at 645, citing: Nampa & 
Meridian Irrigation Dist., 139 Idaho 28 at 33-34 (2003). 
In this case because there is overlap of the permanent and temporary 
injuries this court would award the amount submitted by Biggs Enterprises 
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which estimated the cost of repair to be $42, 685.00. This amount would remedy 
the temporary injuries and prevent any further permanent injuries to the land. 
However, it exceeds the value of the land because only approximately 7 acres 
were injured and the land is valued at $3,800 per acre for a total value of 
$26,600.00. The bid also addresses problems of both a permanent and 
temporary nature as it encompasses the filling of the cuts as well as remedying 
the loss of soil and continued sloughing. Plaintiff must prove the diminution of 
value in his property as a limit to compensatory damages for temporary 
damages as well as for permanent damages. Id. Plaintiff has failed to prove any. 
However, this seems to be one of the very situations which the Supreme Court 
had anticipated when the standards of the application of the diminution value 
limit was relaxed under Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist .. Id. 
The land in its current condition is not suitable to build on, not is it 
capable of being cultivated. Despite the diminution of the land's value not being 
proved, the value of the land has been proved. Therefore, the Court will award 
the value in the amount of$26, 600.00. While this amount will not completely 
restore the Plaintiffs premises to their original conditions, this amount will help 
put the Plaintiffs land back to the condition which it once was and make it 
useful again. Thus, it will remedy the temporary damages while abating any 
future sloughing damages and it is in harmony with the parameters of the law 
and the Supreme Court's direction. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that based 
upon the findings and law set forth by the Supreme Court and the facts of this 
care, the Court hereby finds that the Defendant did in fact injure the Plaintiffs 
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land in excess of the modifications. The injury of soil rendered the property 
unsuitable for its natural use and is continuing in nature. The damages for the 
permanent injuries were not proved during the hearings and therefore the Court 
cannot award damages for the permanent injuries. Other injuries to the land 
resulting from Defendant's trespass are temporary in nature. Defendant is 
liable to the Plaintiff for the excessive and unnecessary damages caused by 
cutting the ditches and the sloughing and pooling that has resulted from the 
easement across the Plaintiffs property. The proper measurement of these 
damages is the cost to restore the land to its pre-injury state. To do so would 
cost $42,685.00, but because this exceeds the value of the property, the Court will 
reduce the award to the estimated value, that being $26,600.00 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall pay this account to 
Plaintiff with the statutory post judgment interest rate accruing from today. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 5th day of December, 2007, Don L. 
Harding, District Judge. 
C. VALUE OF LAND 
There was testimony the land had a value of$3,800.00 per acre. This 
figure was stated by Bob Rauzi a general partner of Farr West. He said the land 
had been owned since 1983, it had been up for sale for approximately 5 years, no 
one had put any earnest money on the land and its asking price was $3,800.00 
per acre.(Tr. 7/21/04, p.168-169) Mr. Rauzi also testified, as owner of the land, 
he thought the land was worth $10,000.00 to $50.000.00 an acre (Tr. 7/21/04, p. 
167) It should also be noted in the original decision of this case by the Supreme 
Court, the Court also erred by stating "while there is some indication in the 
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record that the property was about ten acres in size and was valued at 
approximately $3,900 per acre the judge made no determination about how 
much property was actually damaged or what the value of the property was". 
The Defendant, Mr. Lower, offered to purchase 20 acres of the land 
owned by Farr West situated near his easement of$650.00 an acre. (Tr. 7/21/04, 
p. 116). 
Mr. Allen E. Burris, who was qualified as an expert in land appraisals, 
testified the Farr West land had a value of$600.00 per acre, and he provided an 
written appraisal to support his opinion. (Tr. 4/27/05, p. 140-141) and (exhibit 
QQ). That figure is without merit and the District Court rejected that absurd 
"appraisal". The District Court determined the value to be approximately 
$3,800 per acre. 
D. AMOUNT OF LAND DAMAGED 
There was proof seven to ten acres of the land were damaged. The 
evidence of the amount ofland damaged was given by Thomas Kass Biggs. His 
testimony was based on his going to the property and inspecting the land and 
estimating the cost to repair the damage and trespass created by Topaz. 
Q. Okay. And how many acres does that involve, do you know? 
A. I would approximate maybe 6, 7 acres. I am not good with land. 
Q. If I were to represent to you that this whole thing from here to 
here, around where the trees are down here is approximately 7 
acres? 
A. Okay. 
Q. Then you are talking about maybe a fourth ofit at the most? 
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A. Yeah. I would say so. Maybe a third. 
The land impacted was approximately 7 acres of the entire tract ofland. 
Topaz would have the court award damages in a graffiti case by saying only a 
few bricks were damaged and bricks are only .60¢ each. The result would be 
absurd. This is the only evidence of the amount ofland damaged. The district 
court could, in its discretion, adopt this finding. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
"Attorney fees can be awarded on appeal under [LC. § 12-121] only if the 
appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." Topaz Marketing, L.P., and, Dennis Lower, have simply asked this 
Court to second guess the district court and in doing so has pursued this appeal 
unreasonably and without foundation in light of the long-standing law on issues 
of boundary by agreement and has not presented this Court with any basis in 
fact or law to reverse the district court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Dennis Lower (Topaz), trespassed outside of the description of the 
easement. Dennis Lower (Topaz) changed the flow pattern of runoff and 
drainage waters causing damage and injury to property owned by Farr West. 
The cost to correct the trespass and water damages was determined to be 
approximately $45,000.00. The case was considered by the Supreme Court and 
was remanded for the District Court, not for a new trial but to determine 
additional findings with regard to the damages calculations. That is precisely 
what Judge Harding did. The trial itself had already occurred for a five (5) day 
period. Judge Harding was familiar with the property in that he had personally 
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inspected the property on at least three (3) occasions. It is therefore submitted 
that under I.R.C.P rule 40 (d)(l)(F) no disqualification of the judge is required 
or appropriate. Topaz should not be permitted to engage in judge shopping. 
Regarding the issue of damages. The court in its detailed Memorandum 
Decision and Order, determined the approximate acreage involved, the value of 
the land, and the damage that occurred to Farr West. The determination is 
supported by the record, and is supported by the case of Nampa & Meridian 
Irrigation Dist., 139 Idaho 28, 72 P.3d 868 (2003), The Court's analysis is 
consistent with the proofs submitted. If a person were to spray graffiti on a 
public building the cost of repair would be that reasonable amount necessary to 
restore the building to its condition prior to the damage caused. The damages 
awarded for the clean up should be the actual cost of the clean up not the value 
of the individual sixty (60) bricks that were damaged by the paint as is 
advocated by Topaz. 
It is submitted that Topaz is simply asking this Court to second guess the 
District Judge who has personally inspected the property regarding the loss, 
injury and damages as such it would be appropriate to award cost and fees on 
the appeal to Farr West. Therefore the District Courts determination of 
damages should be sustained and the rulin 
Attorney for th Plaintiffi'Respondent 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the:U'h day of March, 2009, in accordance 
with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellant Rules, I mailed two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to the following by placing the same in 
the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid thereon: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr., Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 4866 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4866 
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